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Although they provide catchy labels, "animal
liberation" and "animal rights" have occasioned
considerable misunderstanding and much pointless debate.
1 want, here, to explicate what I believe is being sought
for animals under these labels. This explication should
help to undo some of the misunderstandings about
liberating animals and extending moral rights to them.
After this explication, I will turn to the issue of the way
in which scientific knowledge of natural entities,
processes, and organizations is and is not relevant to
animal liberation.
PART I: WHAT ANIMAL LIBERATION IS ABOUT
One of these misunderstandings concerns the use of
"animal" in these labels. At most animal liberation
presentations, there is someone who rises to inquire
whether flies, cockroaches, and other vermin are to enjoy
rights to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. Is
swatting a fly to be murder in the brave New World of
animal rights? This heckler is soon joined, if not
preceded, by another who accuses the animal liberationist
of discriminating against plants and, consequently, being
guilty of "fauna chauvinism." Do the arguments for
animal liberation entail plant liberation as well? Of
course, these hecklers are not sincere activists in the
mosquito and tomato liberation movements. What they
are attempting to do is to dispose of the animal liberation
movement through a reductio ad absurdum argument. As
William James noted many years ago, the first response
to a revolutionary idea is ridicule.
The insect and flora reductios will not work,
however, because most animal liberationists accept what
has come to be called "the interest requirement" for
having moral rights. According to this criterion, which
was first proposed by Leonard Nelson in A System of
Ethics, all and only beings with interests can have moral
rights (Yale University Press 1956). Having interests is
to be interpreted as follows: an individual has an interest
in something if and only if that something affects (will
affect, would affect) the individual's feelings of wellbeing.
In turn, "feelings of well-being" is to be
interpreted as referring to pleasure and pain, feeling fit
and feeling ill, elation and depression, feelings of
fulfillment and feelings of frustration, and the many other
feelings which contribute to or detract from the enjoyment
of or satisfaction with life. Now, the "animal" in "animal
liberation" and "animal rights" refers to all and only those
beings which meet the interest requirement. The phrase
"sentient being" is often employed to make this reference.
Thus, the criterion for being an "animal," in this
moral sense, is not the biological criterion which
distinguishes fauna from flora.
Nor are animal
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liberationists confused about this, since most of them
readily acknowledge that very probably not all biological
animals have interests and, consequently, cannot have
moral rights. As for the insects and the plants, all those
which can meet the interest requirement must, if animal
liberationists are to be consistent, be included in the
concerns of this movement. However, to date, there has
been no serious evidence showing that plants have
feelings of well-being. Whether or which insects have
interests is a more open question.
It does not follow from this, however, that the insect
reductio carries the day against animal liberation. If
some insects have feelings of well-being, then a morality
which attempts to respect all sentient beings will be more
complicated than it would be if no insects were sentient.
Of course, this sort of consequence is true of all
moralities; the more diverse the group owed respect, the
more complicated the morality must be. For example,
dealing morally with one's "fellows" is more complicated
now that women and racial and ethnic minorities are
included among the rights-holders due respect. To one
degree or another, we probably all share a yearning for
a simpler life, but that practicing a revolutionary morality
would be more complicated than resting content with the
status quo does not indicate that revolutionary morality is
ridiculous, wrong, or even less warranted than the status
quo.
Furthermore, acknowledging that some insects have
moral rights would not by itself resolve the matter of how
we are to deal with them, especially in conflict of interest
situations. Since to have moral rights is not necessarily
to have the same set of rights as or equal priority of
rights with other rights-holders, extending moral rights to
those who have not enjoyed them before does not settle
the matter of how we are to treat them. Rather, it opens
the door to questions about how we ought (morally) to
treat them which had not previously seemed relevant
(Caplan 1983).
For example, the Emancipation
Proclamation was not the culmination but the beginning
of the civil rights movement. Also, in attempting to
answer these new questions about how we ought (morally)
to treat animals, if simple applications of ideas of
equality, self-determination, and similar concepts
commonly associated with liberation and rights would be
ridiculous, then we can expect that those simple
applications will, for that very reason, be rejected. This
is what has happened in working out other liberation
movements (e.g., the recent rejection of the claim that an
end to sexual discrimination entails that male workers are
entitled to maternity leave). In actual practice, ridiculous
consequences do not discredit the basic principles of
moral reform; rather, such consequences lead to a more

subtle and practical understanding of those principles—
an understanding which eliminates the ridiculous
consequences.
Finally, we may note that although these "where do
you draw the line" questions may be amusing and
conceptually intriguing, they are irrelevant to the current,
major, practical concerns of the animal liberation
movement (e.g., the immorality of factory farming,
animal research, hunting, rodeos, etc.). If any nonhuman animals have interests, then the animals (e.g.,
pigs, monkeys, bears, horses, etc.) that the animal rights
movement is currently seeking to liberate surely do.
Once the questions currently being raised concerning how
we ought (morally) to treat these animals have been
settled, it may be time to wonder whether insects have
moral rights, need to be liberated, and what form such an
enlightened morality should take. To bring up the
question of insects before these current questions have
been resolved is merely an attempt to avoid facing the
real and clear issues at hand.
"Liberation" also requires some explication when
applied to animals. Advocates of liberating or extending
moral rights to animals view this extension as being a
revolutionary break with moral tradition, including the
anti-cruelty to animals part of that tradition, and as
providing for animals something of great moral
importance. The predominant attitude regarding animal
interests today is that what animals require for an
enjoyable, satisfying life (e.g., freedom to roam, freedom
from pain, and life itself) may be routinely sacrificed in
the pursuit of human happiness, provided the animals are
not treated sadistically and are spared suffering that can
be conveniently and economically avoided. Thus, the
anti-cruelty to animals tradition continues to consider and
treat animals as fundamentally resources for human
consumption, limiting moral concern to the humane
handling and processing of those resources. On the other
hand, "liberating" animals refers to putting an end to the
routine sacrifice of animal interests for human benefit,
even where the sacrifice is executed humanely.
Animal liberationists emphasize respecting the
interests of animals themselves, as opposed to being solely
or even primarily concerned with the interests that
humans have in using animals. The primary purpose of
extending moral rights to animals would be to ensure that
their interests could be sacrificed for fulfilling the
interests of others only in the sorts of situations and
according to the sorts of principles which justify
sacrificing the interests of some humans to fulfill the
interests of others.
For example, just as current
regulations basically restrict risky medical research on
humans to experiments which seem likely not only to
benefit the wider community but also to be therapeutic (or
otherwise beneficial) for the research subjects themselves,
so the extension of moral rights to animals would
basically limit risky medical research on animals to
experiments which would have a good chance of being
therapeutic (or otherwise beneficial) for the animal
subjects of that research. Such a restriction would, of
course go far beyond even the most liberal of our current
humane regulations concerning the use and sacrifice of
animals in biomedical research, and its adoption would
mark a revolutionary step beyond our anti-cruelty to
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animals tradition.
Thus, talk of "liberating" animals and extending
moral "rights" to them refers to changing our attitude
toward animals from one which regards them as beings
which must be treated humanely but which are,
nonetheless, fundamentally resources for fulfilling human
interests to an attitude which regards animals as fellow
beings whose interest in an enjoyable, satisfying life must
be respected and protected in the way basic human
interests are respected and protected. In this way,
liberating animals would require changing our attitude
toward animals in basically the same way liberating
blacks and women requires changing the attitudes
concerning them held by whites and men.
Another source of misunderstanding lies in the use of
the phrase "equal rights" when discussing animal
liberation.
As already noted, animal liberationists
routinely deny that they are seeking for animals the same
set of rights already enjoyed by humans. Recognizing
that rights are tied to interests and that animals do not
have all the interests we do (e.g., in religion and
education) animal liberationists recognize that it would be
nonsensical to seek for animals all the rights we require.
For example, Roger W. Galvin, the attorney who
prosecuted the famous Taub case, proposes the following
rights for animals: 1) all sentient beings have a right to
live out their lives according to nature; 2) all sentient
beings have a right to live in a habitat ecologically
sufficient for normal existence; and 3) all sentient beings
have a right to be free from exploitation (Newsmagazine
of the Animal Rights Network). These are sufficiently
different from our "Bill of Rights" and "Declaration of
the Universal Rights of Man" to make clear that animal
liberationists are not seeking extensional equality of rights
for animals.
It might be thought that what animal liberationists are
seeking is completely equal priority of rights for animals.
For example, it has been suggested that animal
liberationists would feel an obligation to show no
preference for feeding starving children over feeding
starving dogs. However, once again matters are not
nearly so simple. First of all, assertions of equal rights
do not entail completely equal priority even among
humans. For instance, people who believe that men,
women and children have equal moral standing have,
nonetheless, commonly believed that women and children
should be given priority in an emergency.
And
conversely, no one would suggest that if we hold the
traditional belief that women and children are entitled to
first place in the lifeboats, consistency requires us to
conclude that they would be justified in using men as
research tools, eating them for dinner, and hunting them
for sport.
We cannot infer from the principles used when we
are forced to choose the lesser of two evils to the
principles of moral status in force when such a hard
choice is not required. Such emergency principles are
invoked not as extensions of common moral principles,
but as auxiliaries needed because those common principles
do not provide satisfactory guidance in these uncommon
situations.
This distinction of ordinary from
extraordinary cases in morality undercuts the many
"burning building," "desert island," "lifeboat," etc.,

supposed reductios of the animal liberation position. That
animals' lives could justifiably be sacrificed in preference
to human lives in certain situations where such a hard
choice had to be made, does not entail that their lives can
(morally) be routinely sacrificed to support our eating
habits, clothing preferences, entertainment, reluctance to
control the size of our own population, unwillingness to
adopt healthier ways of life, desire to avoid certain risks,
etc. Consequently, such "them or us" cases are logically
isolated and insignificant for the animal liberation debate,
since that debate is primarily concerned with the
principles governing our ordinary moral practice.
Thus, animal liberation seeks neither to extend to
animals the same set of rights enjoyed by humans nor to
deny that human life can have a greater moral worth than
animal life. Rather, animal liberationists contend that just
as it would be immoral to follow Swift's "modest
proposal" routinely (and avoidably) to sacrifice some
people's interest in life in order to fulfill others' interest
in food, so it should be immoral routinely (and avoidably)
to sacrifice animals' interest in life for such purposes
(Swift 1729). Of course, what is and what is not
"avoidable" will always be a slippery issue. The animal
liberation literature suggests that, roughly, "avoidable"
here means "eliminable without severely compromising
the general welfare." For example, it is repeatedly
emphasized in this literature that a vegetarian diet can be
a healthy, appetizing one, that we can both keep warm
and be ostentatious without furs, and that we can enjoy
the wilderness without hunting. I am unaware of any
animal liberationist saying something like, "We must
liberate animals, even if that means an end to human
civilization!" It should go without saying that issues of
what is and what is not avoidable can become quite
complex and must (logically) be decided on a case by case
basis. What is important to the general animal liberation
position is that the burden of proof is to be on those who
would sacrifice animal interests for the general welfare,
just as it is on those who would sacrifice the interests of
some humans to help other humans (e.g., in time of war),
and that justification requires demonstrating not merely
some marginal increase in utility through the sacrifice but,
rather, requires demonstrating both that prohibiting the
sacrifice would severely compromise the general welfare
(which is not to be restricted to human welfare) and that
the sacrifice is distributed fairly.
It is in thus sharing legal and moral protections
against the routine, avoidable sacrifice of one's interests
that animal liberation seeks "equal rights" for animals.
PART II: THE IMPORTANCE OF THE SCIENTIFIC
STUDY OF NATURE TO ANIMAL LIBERATION
One of the traditions of response to the animal
liberation movement has been to portray it as the product
of ignorance. Sometimes this is supposed to be ignorance
of the nature of morality; sometimes it is supposed to be
ignorance of how animals are actually treated in
laboratories or on farms; sometimes it is supposed to be
ignorance of the order of nature. For example, in a
recent article entitled, "The natural wrongs about animal
rights and animal liberation," Randall S. Ott, writes:
"The beliefs espoused by animal rightists/liberationistsare
in conflict with scientific knowledge about the place of all
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animals, including the human animal, in the biosphere"
(Journal of American Veterinary Medical Assoc. 1995).
Ott's claim is that science teaches us that all forms of life
are in a struggle for the survival of the fittest, are living
off one another in biotic communities, and that ideas of
liberating animals are in conflict with such teachings. Is
this so?
One of the well-established principles of moral
philosophy is that "ought implies can." According to this
principle, it would be nonsensical to say that we ought to
do something, if it is not possible for us to do it. For
example, a commandment that instructed us to live
without breathing would be nonsensical, simply because
we cannot do that. Moral imperatives are supposed to
give us practical guidance; that is, to direct us toward
doing what we can to make the world a better place.
Consequently, proposed values which conflict with natural
law, and therefore with what is physically possible, can
have no place in actual moral practice.
Now, is it the case that animal liberation directs us to
do things we cannot do? For instance, is it physically
impossible for us to stop sacrificing animals in biomedical
research? Is it physically impossible for us to stop
factory farming animals? Is it physically impossible for
us to stop sport hunting and trapping animals? The
answer to these questions is that it is obviously possible
for us to stop exploiting animals in these ways. While
the law of gravity may prevent us from levitating
ourselves just by wishing to do so, no law of evolutionary
natural selection or ecological holism makes it impossible
for us to stop exploiting animals in these ways. Since
there are many people leading healthy, satisfying,
reproductive lives who, for religious or ethical reasons,
consciously avoid exploiting animals, it is mind-boggling
that anyone would even think of saying that it is
impossible for us to liberate animals from human
exploitation. Anyone making such a preposterous claim
must be woefully—and perhaps willfully—ignorant of the
diverse ways in which people choose to live.
Since the advent of modern science, it has been
common for some moralists to recommend patterning
morality after science. In the 18th century, the science to
emulate was physics, in the 19th century was biology, and
in the latter half of the 20th century the science of
ecology has become a candidate for moral paradigm. All
such programs to transform morality into a science are
logically doomed to failure for two reasons. The first is
that, to cite a famous slogan, "you cannot derive an ought
from an is." The second is that it is the function of moral
imperatives to counterbalance natural tendencies.
A basic principle of logic is that any idea asserted in
the conclusion of a valid argument must have some
evidence to support it in the premises of that argument.
It follows that any argument in which all the premises
concern matters of fact, that is, concern the way things
are, cannot justify a conclusion about the way things
ought to be, precisely because the idea of ought to is not
found in any of the premises. An argument of the form,
"Driving bamboo shoots under people's fingernails causes
them excruciating pain; therefore, we should not do that"
is invalid, unless some sort of unstated, imperative
premise, such as "We should not cause people
excruciating pain," which contains the idea should not is

included. Thus, while the facts and principles discovered
by science can be of immense help in accomplishing our
moral goals, moral values can never follow just from
scientific discoveries, and moral philosophy can never
become an empirical science.
Turning to the second reason why morality cannot be
a natural science, this is because we turn to morality
precisely because we find our natural inclinations wanting.
If by natural instinct we always did, or even just
attempted to do, those things which would make the world
a better place, we would have no need of moral
imperatives to do this rather than that. Presumably,
angels do not have to be commanded to respect the rights
of others, for they have no inclination to do other than
love others. We humans have aggressive, domineering,
selfish, greedy, violent, and other inclinations which lead
us routinely to destroy the well-being of others, humans
as well as animals. We have elaborated and teach moral
rules in an attempt to inhibit those destructive tendencies.
Consequently, moral values never arise merely from a
study of the way things are; they always arise from a
study which includes projections of what would be a
better world than the way things are.
Thus, the function that natural science can fulfill for
morality is not and can never be that of establishing what
is morally right and wrong. It can establish boundaries
for moral imperatives by determining what it is physically
possible for us to do, but this function is seldom
important, since moralists seldom, if ever, command
people to do what is physically impossible. Certainly, no
animal liberationist of my acquaintance commands us to
do what we cannot do. It does not follow, however, that
because natural science cannot dominate morality, it has
no function to perform for morality.
Another famous phrase is that, "the best laid plans of
mice and men often go astray." Sometimes they go astray
because people did not understand how to get where they
were going. Morality is a program of trying to get
somewhere, namely, to a better world. Understanding the
way the world is, what forces have led to its being the
way it is, what forces are available for changing it, and
what forces obstruct such changes are all important factual
understandings for those who would improve the world.
For example, understanding why men want to dominate
women, the different forms that tendency can take, what
sorts of behavioral and pharmacological strategies are
effective at inhibiting that tendency, and what the side
effects of those strategies are, are all important
understandings for someone who seeks effectively and
without generating even greater problems to reduce the
incidence of men battering women. People who espouse
moral ideals but who do not learn the facts needed to
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work effectively toward those ideals will be ineffective at
best and are actually likely to cause a great deal of harm
in their ignorant pursuit of good.
In the case of animal liberation, natural science can
help us understand, first of all, what actually causes
animal suffering and what may appear to do so but
actually does not. For example, some animals like to
cluster, so that confining them in areas that seem
overcrowded from our perspective does them no harm.
Similarly, natural science can help us find effective ways
to relieve animal suffering. Again, science can help us
find alternatives which satisfy our needs without
exploiting animals. Finally, natural science objectively
directed at ourselves could help us understand why we are
inclined to exploit animals and what could be effective
strategies for controlling the destructive expressions of
those inclinations. For instance, why is it that some
people enjoy killing animals, and what can be done to
cure them of this disease?
In all areas of human endeavor, moral and otherwise,
factual knowledge is useful for reaching the goals we
seek.
It is regrettable that well-meaning people
sometimes waste valuable time and energy trying to make
the world a better place, but failing to do so because they
do not understand the natural forces which make the
world the way it is and which need to be controlled in
order to make it a better place. Animal liberationists
need to inform themselves about natural science in order
to be effective, just as morally concerned natural
scientists need to inform themselves about logic and moral
philosophy in order to understand how moral values
originate and how moral reasoning works.
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